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ABSTRACT   
 
This article demonstrates the continued prevalence of traditional, heteronormative practices 
regarding marriage and naming practices in Britain, and also considers the complex choices 
made by same-sex couples who marry in relation to whether there are any benefits in changing 
their surname. The study draws on data from an online survey of 1,000 UK respondents, and 
reveals that it continues to be viewed as more ‘normal’ for a woman to take her husband’s 
surname in a heterosexual union than for her to make any other choice. Whilst other options 
(such as the woman retaining the surname given to her by her parents, for instance) are often 
considered in relation to heterosexual marriage, these continue to be seen as a deviation from the 
norm. We find that the role of tradition is critical to heterosexual women’s decisions over what 
to do with their surname, whether they follow the culturally expected route or consciously 
deviate from it. Same-sex couples are broadly perceived to have comparably more freedom than 
heterosexuals regarding their names, and here we analyse whether this is the case. Through 
qualitative critical analysis of the discursive responses of those completing our survey, and some 
quantitative discussion of the data, we demonstrate that heteronormative assumptions about a 
woman’s role in a heterosexual relationship have continued salience and that this leads to a 
conscious and often difficult negotiation of her own identity as both an individual and a wife.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Civil partnerships were made available to same-sex couples in Britain in 2005 and, since 2012, 
same-sex couples in England and Wales have shared the same marriage rights as mixed-sex 
couples; marriage is now legally defined as a union between two people, rather than specifically 
between a woman and a man. Marriage as an institution has also changed enormously in the past 
50 years, with divorce rates increasing3 and more couples getting married after the birth of their 
children, or not at all. Despite this, there are certain traditions which – for heterosexual couples, 
at least – seem to have been retained; many brides still choose to wear a white gown or be ‘given 
away’ by their father, for example, and many women change their surname to that of their 
husband. 
 
                                               
1 This work was supported in part by the ESRC Centre for Corpus Approaches to Social Science [grant number 
ES/K002155/1]. 
2 Together, the authors represent the Discourses of Marriage Research Group 
(http://discoursesofmarriage.blogspot.co.uk/)  
3 ONS (2013) figures suggest that circa 42% of marriages are expected to end in divorce.  
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There have been debates about the changing of a woman’s surname to that of her new husband’s 
from at least the 19th century, when Lucy Stone campaigned for the right to retain her surname 
on marriage.4 The law on couverture, which meant that a woman became the possession of her 
husband together with her assets and capital, was not revised in the UK until the 1930s. Goldin 
and Shim (2004:143) note that it remained the norm until the 1970s for women, even those who 
were ‘highly educated and eminent’, to take their husband’s surname. Feminist movements in the 
1970s and 1980s led to some rejection of this practice, however, as taking a husband’s surname 
came to be seen as an everyday indication of the power of patriarchy.5 Feminist campaigns (see 
Moran, 2004) questioned the value and benefit of marriage for women generally, and the 
changing of one’s name specifically. Despite this, the changing of one’s name upon marriage has 
more recently been somewhat normalised - Thwaites (2012: 104), for instance, found that 74% 
of British women who were married to men (of a sample of 102) had changed their name - and 
the practice is neither universally accepted nor rejected by feminists (Mills, 2012). Some of the 
most recent debates on women’s surname choices upon marriage were sparked, for example, 
when international lawyer Amal Clooney changed her surname to her new husband’s in 2014. 
Reactions to this name change ranged from firm endorsement through discussions of choice to 
complete rejection (see Mills, 2015), showing that the issue of surname change remains a topical 
one.  
 
Here, we explore this issue using the results of a survey of 1,000 respondents from around the 
UK. The article outlines the main findings of this survey, revealing apparent trends amongst both 
same-sex and mixed-sex couples regarding naming strategies upon becoming married or civil 
partnered. We also analyse the narrative responses to our questions to draw a number of 
conclusions regarding the symbolic significance of a shared surname and, more specifically, the 
role of tradition within marriage and the family today, for same-sex and opposite sex couples. 
First, we outline the theoretical approach taken in our analysis, one inspired by approaches 
within critical discourse analysis, feminist linguistics, and queer theory. We present the 
methodological decisions made and the implications of these on the data collected, before 
outlining the quantitative results and moving onto a discourse analysis of responses.  
 
2. THEORETICAL CONTEXT  
 
We draw on Fairclough (1989), who argues that powerful ideologies are legitimised and 
reproduced through the linguistic and cultural conventions that we often take for granted. From 
                                               
4 Before the 19th century it was fairly common among the aristocracy for males to change their surnames to that of a 
woman that they were marrying who was richer or from a more powerful family than their own. 
5 Furthermore, in an indication of asymmetry, the term ‘maiden name’ applies exclusively to women and makes 
implicit links to notions of innocence, youth, and virginity, none of which are automatically presumed of grooms-to-
be. 
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this perspective, heterosexual women being called upon to change their name to their husband’s 
may reinforce patriarchal ideologies surrounding the family; these ideologies are reinforced 
through multiple institutions, including those of the law, the church, the media and the 
government.6 Indeed, as Althusser (1994) would argue, such ideologies are frequently called 
upon by such institutions as common-sense representations in a process of interpellation and, as 
we strive to be recognised as certain types of subject, we either submit to or challenge these 
ideologies. Decisions made upon getting married in relation to our surnames, then, lead us to 
either engage critically with these ideologies or accept them as common sense.  
 
As analysts, we must examine the ways in which these ‘common sense’ ideas are produced. 
Crucially, to fully understand the ways in which discourse can both shape and reflect broader 
social structures, we must consider the context in which they are produced (Fairclough, 1992; 
Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Wodak and Chilton, 2005). Critical discourse analysis (CDA), often 
considers specific texts (such as newspaper articles or advertisements) which are seen to 
reproduce pervasive ideologies surrounding gender, class, race, etc., due in part to their 
production by those with power (e.g. van Dijk 1993, Weiss and Wodak 2003). Through the 
systematic analysis of linguistic features in these texts, it is possible to show how particular 
ideologies are produced and sustained.7 Such work is motivated by a political desire to expose 
the sometimes subtle or implicit ideological messages underlying texts produced by those with 
cultural or economic power. Here, drawing on the ethos of CDA, we produce a discourse 
analysis of responses to questions about surnames and identify the linguistic means by which the 
respondents take particular stances towards naming strategies. We argue that all social actors 
have the potential to both reproduce and challenge dominant ideologies, since discourse is key to 
the reproduction and transformation of social identities, social relationships and systems of 
knowledge and belief (Fairclough 1992: 64); we provide in this article a critical account of that 
discourse.  
 
Our approach is informed by feminist CDA and queer linguistics. The central concern of 
feminist CDA, according to Lazar (2005), is to expose and challenge that which reproduces 
dominant discourses of patriarchy, and that which reproduces harmful gender ideologies. 
However, we extend this approach by integrating queer theory into our analysis, focusing on 
discourses that serve to marginalise those who do not meet the heteronormative ideal and 
normalise those who reflect dominant ideals of gender and sexuality (Motschenbacher and Stegu 
2013: 520). Rather than view discourses as reproducing a patriarchal social order alone, then, 
we argue that patriarchy is one aspect of a broader heteronormative cultural structure. A primary 
focus on patriarchal structures and discourses may arguably lead to analyses which do not fully 
                                               
6 See Paterson (2015) for comments on the asymmetry of UK deed poll procedures. 
7 Peterson’s (2010) careful use of CDA to reveal the normative, homophobic ideologies underpinning the American 
organisation ‘Family Research Council’ is an excellent example of this. 
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explore and critique underlying assumptions about women and men (such as their representation 
as heterosexual, monogamous, gender normative people). By taking a queer approach, we 
actively engage in analysis which seeks to reveal these heteronormative assumptions. Thus,  we 
focus not only on how traditions of surname changing positions women as, for example, the 
property of their husband, but on how those traditions contribute to the normalising of mixed-sex 
relationships and the othering or idealising of same-sex ones. Ideologies surrounding gender and 
sexuality are particularly likely to be found within conventions associated with the institution of 
marriage, of course, given its traditional role as a heterosexual union and its fundamentally 
patriarchal history.  
 
Of course, that the option to change one’s name upon marriage even exists also symbolises an 
expected change in identity. It allows an individual (traditionally a woman) to articulate their 
status, in terms of their private relationship with another person, in a public and institutionally-
recognised way. In articulating one’s familial status in this way, it may be argued that an 
individual engages in an act of identity (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985), or that a surname 
change – specifically, taking on the name of a partner or altering one’s name to include theirs – 
is indexical of marriage, a culturally-recognised tool of categorisation. It may be expected, 
particularly in relation to heterosexual women, that a name change occurs to indicate a change in 
identification – from single person to married person. As will be shown in our data, however, not 
all married people associate their change in status to a change in identity, and not all people 
change their name. Indeed, as empirical work with American women has shown, for many 
people a name change would be akin to a loss of identity (Laskowski 2010; Sheuble and Johnson 
20078).  
 
As social actors, however, we are framed culturally by the broader categories we are seen as 
being aligned with (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 594); to be a woman in a heterosexual marriage is 
largely seen as being a ‘wife’, and a name change (preceded by ‘Mrs’) has long been perceived 
as normal in Western society. Of course, the very institutional nature of marriage has reinforced 
this; in the United States until the 1970s, for example, it was a legal requirement for a woman to 
share her husband’s name in order to engage in activities such as voting (Emens 2007). The 
historical tradition of surname change, we argue, means that individuals and couples are forced 
to make some sort of a decision; even deciding not to change one’s name may be seen as a 
conscious choice and, therefore, an identity move. The cultural ramifications of the various 
surname options available to married people, and the inevitable links with identity, are therefore 
considered carefully in this article. 
   
 
                                               
8 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for directing us to these works. 
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3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
  
The survey was created and hosted using the online questionnaire tool SurveyMonkey, and was 
live for four weeks in September/October 2014. A link to the survey was shared via press 
releases from our home institutions, our personal/professional social media feeds and our group 
blog, in comments posted beneath relevant news articles, and in a BBC regional radio slot (with 
corresponding web page) that referred to our work.9 Online surveys are susceptible to some level 
of self-selection bias (Wright, 2006), and we found that most of our respondents were women 
(83.9%), with the overwhelming majority of respondents (73.5%) identifying as heterosexual.10 
Given that naming upon marriage historically and predominantly has been an issue for 
heterosexual women, the dominance of these participants is unsurprising. We do not claim, 
however, to be providing a representative picture of naming choices in the UK; what we do have 
is a large number of responses, from which we wish to make some claims about prevalent 
ideologies circulating in Britain today.  
  
Questions11 were posed to collect demographic data (relationship status, gender, sexual identity 
and age), with free-text fields used to collect responses about personal choices regarding 
surnames and titles for self, significant other(s) and children, and anecdotes about the choices of 
(unnamed) friends and family. All respondents were also asked what they felt the options 
available to same-sex couples with regard to naming on marriage are. Of the demographic 
questions, only ‘relationship status’ was mandatory (in order to set the framing of subsequent 
questions), and offered respondents a dropdown set of choices. Gender and sexuality were open-
format questions, enabling respondents to self-identify using their own terms. There is not space 
here to develop a full discussion of respondents’ choices in this regard, but it is worth noting that 
while a number of responses seemed to evidence a certain level of heteronormativity (i.e. >6.2% 
of respondents appeared uncertain about what ‘sexuality’ referred to, and entered their gender 
identity in response to this question), some others took the opportunity to personalise their 
responses (e.g. “Human”; “Kinsey 1.5”; “Flexibly straight”), demonstrating a rejection of binary 
labels.  
 
Given that the questions in the survey concerned people’s opinions on naming choices, we frame 
our linguistic analysis of the data in terms of stance. Broadly conceived, ‘stance’ refers to 
                                               
9 Since the work was shared in this way, survey completions spiked in response to particular announcements rather 
than trickling steadily in; we have a disproportionate number of respondents from the north west of England, for 
instance, because a news item about the survey shared on the University of Liverpool’s website attracted a lot of 
attention, and seemed to spread by word of mouth very rapidly at that point. 
10 It should be noted that, though we asked participants to categorise their gender identity and sexual identity, some 
participants chose not to respond to these questions. 
11 The questions used in this survey are listed on a blog post written by the group, and can be found here: 
http://discoursesofmarriage.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/surname-strategies-results.html   
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‘lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements or commitment 
concerning the propositional content of a message’ (Biber and Finnegan, 1989: 92). Stance can 
be indexed via a number of different linguistic and discoursal strategies, but the analysis that 
follows focuses on the following features: lexical connotations, modality choices, stance verbs 
expressing feelings and attitudes, and agency. Through analysing the different strategies of 
stance-taking, we show how ideologies of heteronormativity and patriarchy are negotiated and 
oriented to in the respondents’ discourse.    
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
Within this section, we group our analyses of stance under four headings which outline the main 
reasons given for changing or retaining one’s name upon marriage: following or rejecting 
tradition; being united; maintaining independence; and aiding the general administration of 
family life. We then follow this with a final analysis section, in which we analyse participants’ 
thoughts about the surname options of same-sex couples who get married. Underpinning the four 
aforementioned themes, as stated above, is the notion of identity. Indeed, the identity work that 
naming practices achieve is signalled in the high frequency of the term ‘identity’ in our data, 
occurring 142 times in total across the dataset and holding statistical significance (compared to 
with the British National Corpus [BNC]12). For this reason, we argue that whatever the decisions 
participants make about their surname choices upon marriage, the stances they take enable the 
construction of identity in terms of how they label themselves and how others perceive them. 
Below, we show how our respondents position themselves in relation to marital expectations – in 
some cases, claiming the identity of ‘traditionalist’, for example. 
 
4.1 Tradition 
  
The concept of tradition was a dominant factor influencing people’s surname choices, with 
‘tradition’ being one of the most frequent lexical words in the dataset (occurring 89 times in its 
various word-forms). Although we did not identify a pattern of diachronic change in 
respondents’ naming choices (Paterson, in preparation), some heterosexual female respondents 
sought to place taking their husband’s name as the default preference and within a temporal 
context: “In 1982, it was very uncommon NOT to change your name, and I just went with the 
tradition without really giving it any consideration” (respondent’s emphasis13); “At the time it 
was normal practice to take the future husband’s name”; “Being married in the seventies it was 
still traditional for most women to change their surname to that of the husband”. Although 
married and divorced heterosexual men who answered this question were more likely to cite 
                                               
12 This means that the word ‘identity’ appears statistically more frequently than we would expect it to in general 
English, and is therefore particular to our dataset. 
13 Note that all responses are presented here unedited. 
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tradition without qualification, some also referred to the time of their marriage – “Unusual not to 
change the wife’s name in those days” – in explaining the fact that their wives adopted their 
names. Many of our respondents who married more recently, or were not yet married, also cited 
tradition as a relevant factor in explaining the decisions they would make, however.  
 
Often, these (heterosexual female) respondents describe taking their husband’s surname as 
something that happened primarily because it did not occur to them not to do so, clearly 
perceiving the move not as a decision but simply the norm. For example, one respondent said “I 
didn't even think about it really. We just did the traditional thing and I changed my name to his” 
– note how the presence of the modal adverbs ‘even’ and ‘just’ emphasise the lack of 
engagement in a process of decision-making. Among married or previously married heterosexual 
women and men, this formulation appears often: “We just stuck with the traditional way of doing 
it”; “I just went along with the ‘normal’"; “Just went the traditional route” (our emphasis). A lack 
of certainty expressed via modality choices is present in other responses, such as “Realistically, 
tradition most probably” and “Tradition I suppose”; these suggest a lack of investment in naming 
choices, with the use of the stance adverbials ‘realistically’ and ‘I suppose’ implying that this is 
the first time that the respondents have appraised their actions. Responses containing some 
formulation of “I had no reason not to” were also frequent, and are indicative of the extent to 
which these respondents naturalised tradition as the agent in this process. These responses 
indicate that not all married persons view name-changing as an act of identity; it is seen as 
inevitable that the change takes place and therefore they remove their own agency from the 
process. Yet, importantly, an action has been taken – one which may be interpreted, in line with 
broader cultural structures and expectations – as indicative of taking on a new identity as ‘wife’. 
  
A number of women cited their partner’s expectations as being more influential than their own 
desires: “My husband is traditional and felt strongly that I should take his name,” says one 
recently-married respondent who, in contrast to her partner, “did not have a strong opinion either 
way.” Ambivalence is common in responses from people who did not identify with binary 
gender and/or sexuality categories, too, such as “I don't think I am likely to get married, but if I 
did I feel fairly ambivalent about [it] so it would probably have a lot to do with my partner's 
wishes”. The influence of partners in our respondents’ decisions about their surnames is also 
reflected in the prominence of ‘husband’ (239 instances) and ‘partner’ (133) in the data: both are 
in the top 20 most frequent lexical words in our data, and they are both statistically significant 
keywords when compared with the BNC sampler. Indeed, in some cases it was clear that women, 
in particular, felt some pressure to change their name, as in this divorced respondent (who later 
reverted to her own name): “I went along with the traditions for a peaceful life! I had suggested 
that I keep my birth name but he was horrified at the suggestion.” Others also mentioned feeling 
some pressure from their families to follow the heteronormative expectation of changing their 
names: “Didn’t want to rock the boat with our traditional families, it would have caused upset”.  
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These answers chime with the findings of scholarly research into heteronormative marital 
practices; Ball, Cowan and Cowan (1995) found that, while women are more likely to initiate 
discussions about marital issues, their husbands tend to have the greatest influence on the 
outcome of that discussion (see also Zvonkovic et al., 1996). Similarly, with specific reference to 
getting married, Currie’s (1993: 415) participants describe the groom’s ‘right to veto’, even over 
elements of the planning in which he had taken no other part; ‘brides-to-be very often avoided 
conflict by deferring to their partner’s wishes’. It is interesting, especially since Besel et al 
(2009: 111) recently found that bridal magazines typically encourage women to consider other 
people’s feelings, that some of our respondents construct their choices as a kind of lack of action: 
constructions such as “I went along with…” were common, indicating that they view as passive 
their own active, pragmatic decision to prioritise the wishes of others.  
  
Desire is not absent, of course, from women’s responses; a number of female respondents state 
that they wanted to take their husband’s name. This was often bound up with notions of family 
cohesion (see section 4.2), but also with the appeal of tradition.14 While some women seemed 
happy to claim a traditional stance via unmodalised, categorical statements – “We are both very 
traditional”, for example, or “I like the tradition” – a number of claims were qualified in some 
way. As one heterosexual woman said: 
 
My maiden name was a bit awkward (unusual and often misspelled) whereas 
my married name is, frankly, really cool. Plus I am quite traditionalist in some 
respects and was perfectly happy to change my name to my husband’s without 
feeling that it affected my own identity/standing in society/strength as a woman. 
 
This account makes a mitigated commitment to tradition (quite traditionalist in some respects), 
but foregrounds pragmatic reasons for taking the traditional option – doubling up the 
administrative ‘problems’ with her maiden name with the appeal of her husband’s name. There 
appears to be some defensive work here that presupposes negativity towards tradition: in contrast 
to a qualified commitment to tradition, the respondent is unequivocal about her feelings 
regarding this decision (perfectly happy). By invoking a (feminist?) reading of the decision as 
one that the respondent has considered and rejected, its (postfeminist?) soundness is rhetorically 
bolstered. Another respondent (a bisexual woman married to a man) appears to do something 
similar when she writes: “We’re not forced in any way to do it, it’s just what we both know and 
are comfortable with”. The idea of being comfortable with ‘what we know’ also came through in 
the construction “a traditionalist”, an identity position claimed by five of the heterosexual 
                                               
14 An additional reason given by heterosexual women for changing their name was that they preferred their 
husband’s name to their own for aesthetic reasons. For example, ”I never particularly liked my surname”. 
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women in our data but always mitigated: “I’m a bit of a traditionalist about these things”, and “I 
suppose I’m a traditionalist at heart”. In these instances, claims to a traditionalist stance seems to 
be framed as a kind of confession – indeed, data in the BNC suggests that describing oneself as 
something “at heart” is usually to give away a more personal and/or less desirable part of one’s 
character (such as being ‘a purist at heart’). To be “a traditionalist at heart”, then, also suggests 
that this traditionalism is not exercised as frequently as other character traits are, enabling 
respondents to a) implicitly claim a generally more ‘modern’ outlook to which their attitude to 
marriage is an exception, and b) espouse alternative views when discussing, say, the actions or 
available actions of others. Heteronormative traditions within marriage are clearly of central 
importance for many engaged people, then – a perspective described by Nett (1998) as a 
consequence of perceiving weddings (and associated patriarchal marriage rituals) as emotional 
rather than rational events. As Currie (1993: 405) finds, couples who view tradition as holding 
symbolic significance view such norms as solidifying and strengthening, imbuing their marriage 
with a sense of longevity.  
  
4.2 Unity  
 
Connected to notions of tradition is the idea of marriage leads to a change in status; traditionally, 
one becomes ‘a family’ through marriage (Besel et al., 2009) and all sharing a family surname 
has been central to this. It is clear from a number of the responses in our data that this idea has 
continued salience; the word ‘family’ occurs 142 times, and is statistically significant compared 
to the BNC sampler. The words ‘united’ or ‘(family) unit’ were explicitly mentioned 12 times in 
the data, with 9 of these tokens coming from (married and unmarried) heterosexual women in 
relation to wanting to change their name to that of their husband. Being a unit is often associated 
with working together, as in: “I like having the same name, it makes us feel like a team!”. 
Interestingly, although critique of women taking their partners’ names may position the act as 
one of submission to a patriarchal ideal, many women who responded to our survey express the 
view that marriage was about shared endeavour: “I think that sharing the same name as your 
partner makes you stronger, more united, and instantly you are sending a message to others that 
you are two people working together as one.”  
 
Others shared this idea, stating that: “We wanted the same name to indicate our family unit” or 
that, “by having the same surname it shows we are a couple”; “I wanted the same name so we are 
identified as married”. The use of the verbs ‘sending a message’, ‘indicate’, ‘identify’ and 
‘show’ are similar in revealing a concern amongst some respondents to show a wider community 
their institutionally recognised relationship. A heterosexual female respondent puts this 
perspective forward very clearly: “When a man and woman get married, they become a family 
unit. It makes sense that they have the same name, to re-inforce this and communicate to 
everybody that they are married.” Again, the verb choice ‘communicate’ indicates that it is 
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important for a married couple to be recognised as such by others; to suggest that ‘it makes 
sense’ that this is communicated, as in the example above, implies that being a ‘family unit’ is 
not simply about a personal status, but a social one. In this sense, taking on a new name may be 
viewed as a conscious act of identity. Furthermore, it is very much linked to the institutional 
nature of marriage that positions a couple’s personal relationship as more or less valid depending 
on whether they have formally registered it with a government authority. It is logical, perhaps, 
that those who wish to enter such an official union – where their unity is institutionally 
recognised – might also be likely to wish for their union to be publically evident. This seems to 
go beyond the rationalisation that it is ‘just tradition’ – whereby couples present their sharing of 
a name as a passive response to heteronormative expectations – and instead suggests some 
agency in making the decision to share names. 
  
For the many heterosexual women who articulate a need to publicly assert their unity, however, 
there are also heterosexual female respondents who position taking their husband’s surname as a 
very personal decision which affects the way that they feel about their relationship. It is clear 
that, for these women, a shared surname is not about symbolism or a message to others, but a 
personal decision which impacts on their sense of identity, as exemplified by this respondent: “I 
feel as though the name is key to feeling a part of a new family unit of my own. I intend to have 
children with my husband and it is important to me that we all have the same name and feel 
completely a part of one another.” Such examples demonstrate agency in altering the way that 
the respondents perceive their own identity; they reveal that the act of taking a new name has 
also altered their identity by attaching them nominally to a new unit. In this sense, taking a new 
name can be a redefining moment whereby one’s social identity changes as the self becomes 
linked with a coherent unit (the family). For a contributor who states she took her husband’s 
name due to “my new identity as a wife and part of new family unit”, this ‘new identity’ also 
clearly correlates with a new cultural membership category of ‘wife’. Rather than holding 
negative connotations, in these instances, the word seems to represent a new status in relation to 
one’s husband. Agency in the naming decisions is also reflected grammatically in the 
respondents’ formulations here – the women are agents of the stance verbs in active clause 
structures, such as ‘I wanted + X’, and in the stance clauses ‘I feel + X’ and ‘I intend + X’.  
 
Being a wife is also fundamentally connected with being a family and, in turn, it is clear that – 
for the majority of our respondents – being a family means having children. Taking a new name, 
whether to publicly mark oneself out as a unit or index a sense of personal identity, is seen as 
having a symbolic role in building a family. As one heterosexual female respondent explains, “I 
wanted [us and the children] to share the same name, to show that we were one family”. This 
pattern is followed by some of the lesbian women in our survey. For example, one woman says 
that, although she and her partner do not feel that they need to share a single name, “this may 
change if we have a child”, whilst another says – though she feels surnames are irrelevant – that 
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if she and her partner were to have children they “might double-barrel to give the children the 
same name [as us].” Another lesbian woman stated “As a gay couple, we feel it is particularly 
important to have a 'family' name once we have children, as others might not immediately 
identify us as a family”. It is interesting to note that the idea of sharing a name is important to 
these women, but only if and when they have children; the final example, in particular, suggests 
that being recognised as a family is of particular importance to same-sex couples who may 
otherwise not be assumed to be co-parents to a child. In this case, though, the surname both 
marks out and symbolically constructs a sense of family unity in line with heteronormative 
ideals. This says much about the cultural connection that continues to exist between marriage 
and family, whereby having children may continue to be seen as a reason to marry. Despite the 
prevalence of alternative family arrangements in the 21st century, the institutional pull of 
marriage and family clearly has continued relevance for many.  
  
Although some men refer to the need for family unity in our data, few explicitly mention 
children in their responses. One heterosexual married man expresses concern that “double-
barrelling would have led to unfortunate bullying for our children, so we went with one 
surname”; although this relates to the reason for his wife taking his name instead of double-
barrelling, the assumption that children should have the same name as their parents (and indeed 
father) is clear here. Only one man in a same-sex relationship mentions children, stating that it 
might make him consider sharing a name with a partner if they had children. The relatively small 
number of responses from men regarding children is in itself worthy of comment. The responses 
reflect an assumption that, if anybody is to change their name in order to construct a sense of 
unity, it would be a woman; as it tends to be a woman’s responsibility to make this change, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that women in relationships are more likely to think through the 
consequences of, and reasons for, making these decisions. Heterosexual female respondents also 
comment on the importance of a child having the father’s name to ensure that he feels connected 
to them: “Everyone knows who their mother is, as she is the person who gave birth to them. You 
know who your father is by taking his name”.  
 
These responses draw a seemingly natural and inevitable link between marriage, children, and 
changing one’s name. It seems to be the case that it is assumed that those who marry will also 
have children (van der Bom et al. 2015), and that this is a reason for people changing their name. 
The perception of one’s ‘new’ identity as a wife or a married couple, indicated above, appears 
fundamentally connected to the potential for marriage to lead to children; it seems to be because 
of this definition of ‘family’ that many women opt for – and are expected to desire – a ‘new’ 
name. The data also showed respondents’ concerns about negotiating the expectations that 
emerge with married life with a desire to retain one’s own name and thus be independent, 
however. As shown in the following section, this proves to be an important yet complex move 
for many. 
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4.3 Independence  
 
For the 41 per cent of heterosexual married women who chose not to take their husband’s name, 
their reasoning concerned their wish not to ‘lose’ their identity. For these respondents, the act of 
taking a new name would project a cultural identity that they did not align themselves with, 
whereas the act of retaining their name was an identity move which enabled them to express their 
independence. Unsurprisingly, some of these women explicitly mentioned feminism in their 
responses (forms of ‘feminist’/‘feminism’ occurred 32 times, with 66 per cent of these coming 
from heterosexual women), reflecting Laskowski’s (2010) finding that a feminist identity was a 
main reason for women choosing not to change their name. For example: “I chose to keep my 
own surname and my individual identity after marriage. As a modern feminist I believe the social 
'norm' of the woman taking her husband’s name is outdated and sexist, as it originally indicated 
ownership”. In this example, the respondent is the grammatical agent of the verb ‘chose’, which 
also explicitly – lexically – indexes her agency in the decision-making process. Other words that 
draw on feminist discourses in our data include ‘patriarchy’ (8 instances), ‘sexist’ (9), ‘equal’ 
(17) and ‘ownership’ (10). 
 
Once again, the notion of identity is central to heterosexual women’s views about name changes 
in relation to their independence. Many of the respondents said that retaining their original 
surname on marriage was a way of also retaining their identity within the marriage; for example, 
“My surname is part of me and my identity. I am me not part of someone else (or their 
possession!)” and, “I felt that taking my husbands surname wasn't me, and although I like to be 
married I still wanted my own identity and didn't feel it was necessary to change my name.” The 
word ‘subsume’, where a kept surname acts as ground held (a marker of separateness), occurs 
nine times in the responses, and was found in the responses of gay men and women as well as 
heterosexual women. One lesbian respondent said, “I can't ever imagine having my partner's 
name – that is a part of her, not a part of me. I have been called this all my life so it would be odd 
to 'become' someone else.” Note here the extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) that ramps 
up the oddity of taking a partner’s name (I can’t ever imagine), and the inverted commas that 
endanger the notion of becoming.  
 
These examples suggest that changing names results in identity transformation, which indicates 
the performative power (Butler, 1990, 1993) of naming practices. As well as this notion of the 
transformative power of names, there are also responses that reveal a perception of the self as 
existing prior to outward expressions of identity such as naming. For example, one bisexual man 
states:  
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Both my partner and I decided to remain known under our respective birth names. Taking 
one or the other would have seemed to deny our pre-existing identities, and double-
barrelling would have seemed impossibly posh. We did not even think of blending our 
surnames or taking a new one. 
 
The concept of denying pre-existing identities seems to afford agency to a name, invoking the 
notion of the changing names as an imposition, in this case on both parties. Similarly, one 
bisexual woman states, “I was influenced by feminism and also (...) I didn't want to give up my 
name and stop being me.” The change of state verb ‘stop’ here produces the logical 
presupposition that she would only be ‘herself’ if she retained her name, and changing her name 
on marriage would result in a transformation of her identity. Again, a name carries agency as 
well as symbolism for this respondent, leading to her stance-taking away from what she positions 
as something which would strip her of her independent identity. In a similar example from a 
lesbian woman, a person’s name is intrinsically connected to their identity and a new name is 
positioned as a threat: “I am saddened that women still chose to give up their name. My name is 
who I am. It's mine. Why would I give it up – marriage is a partnership not a hostile takeover.” 
This oppositional construction, whereby ‘a partnership’ is presented as the polar opposite of ‘a 
hostile takeover’, is indicative of many respondents’ negative stance-taking towards the tradition 
of taking a husband’s surname due to the perception that is imposed upon a woman. In this sense, 
much of the resistance towards the practice is based upon a concern that women do not have 
agency in the face of patriarchal expectation.  
 
The complexity of patriarchal norms in relation to a feminist desire for independence is 
particularly apparent in this response, from a heterosexual woman who would choose to double-
barrel her surname: 
 
His would go first, because he's the man. But I'm not giving up my identity, and I want 
our kids to have both. So we'd have Mr & Mrs Hissurname-Mysurname. It's fair, it's 
equal, but his first, because I am, nevertheless a female. And I'd allow him first place! 
 
In this example, although the woman claims agency by refusing to ‘give up’ her identity and 
expressly ‘allowing’ her husband ‘first place’, a concern to acknowledge patriarchal norms 
regarding gender roles is clearly expressed. The implication here that ‘a female’ should be 
second to ‘the man’ may be seen to reflect deep-rooted gender inequalities. Although this 
response was unusual in its implicit acceptance of overt sexism, it reflects the perception of most 
of our respondents that a change in name would, in some way, articulate personal identity. 
Again, as with previous examples, taking a new name in this response is clearly aligned with 
losing independence; this was frequently expressed by heterosexual women in our data in 
relation to their work, a finding which is again reflected in Laskowski’s (2010) data. In 
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particular, for many women the biggest concern is losing the professional identity they have built 
with their original surname. These women frame taking a new name in line with relinquishing 
hard-earned status: “I don’t want to be Mrs anybody. I am Dr xxxxx.” and “I had already 
developed a professional reputation under my maiden name, and did not want to lose it”. The use 
of the verb ‘lose’ in this last example is significant, of course, indicating the vulnerability of 
one’s self-proclaimed identity and the importance of protecting it. This resonates with other 
constructions, mentioned above, that afford agency to a partner’s surname and imply that it 
would ‘take over’ one’s own individual identity and independence. Yet many professional 
women, in particular, had attempted to negotiate their desire for a ‘new’ family name and their 
existing ‘work’ name; 7.7 per cent of respondents referred to this issue, and the words 
‘professional’ and ‘professionally’ are both keywords in the dataset when compared with the 
BNC.  
 
Having multiple surnames is also given as a reason not to change one’s name: “I didn't want to 
change my name in work and I didn't want two separate names for work and my private life.” In 
this respondent’s decision-making, the question of marriage and its relationship with names is 
secondary to more individually-focused professional and pragmatic concerns, yet it still reflects 
the trend in the data whereby heterosexual women often felt they must make a choice (rather 
than their male partners). This reveals the institutional and cultural preoccupation with women’s 
marital status but not men’s. That so many women in our sample felt it was necessary to take on 
different names for different contexts suggests that their personal, domestic identity needed to be 
institutionally-sanctioned, yet they strongly desired to express independence in their professional 
environment; the men in our data did not articulate such concerns. Indeed, few of the male 
respondents position a name change as a choice they might make. Although none of the 
heterosexual married men in our data have changed their names, with one noting that he “didn’t 
want extra spelling hassle”, two explicitly acknowledge that their wife had to make a choice: “I 
kept mine and my wife kept her surname. The sensible thing to do” and, “My partner kept her 
name too. It was never really discussed. That's what she wanted to do and that's fine by me”. 
Here, although the participants do not seem to have been explicitly involved in their wives’ 
decisions to keep their original names, they do evaluate those decisions and position the choice 
as one which was mutually agreed upon – particularly in the phrase ‘that’s fine by me’, these 
responses allow the men to claim some agency alongside their wives. Other heterosexual men 
used this survey to express theirs and their partners’ feminist values, allowing them to take 
stances which position their relationships as ultimately equal, for example: “I believe any name-
changing should be equitable and retain the individual's identity”. For these men – as with many 
of the women in our data – surnames can indicate independence, and a shared name would imply 
an inequality between two partners. 
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4.4 Administration 
 
So far, the data has shown a range of stances taken towards changing one’s name, with the name 
itself often being seen as signalling one’s marital status, familial ties, and independence. For 
many of our respondents, however, it was not the symbolism of taking a new surname (or not) 
that was a main concern, but instead the administrative impact it may have. Some felt that 
changing one’s name would cause problems, whilst others felt that not sharing a family name 
would be a disadvantage, administratively. 
 
One lesbian respondent remarks that while she likes the idea of experimenting with names upon 
marriage, it could cause problems if the couple divorced: “it seems a bit messy to me because if 
the relationship breaks up, what do you do then?!”. Administrative concerns are given by many 
as a reason not to change to a shared family name; as another lesbian woman puts it, “on a 
practical level, changing names, ID docs, bank docs would add another level of adminstrative 
faff to life!”. One heterosexual woman states that she and her husband “both briefly considered 
combining our names into a chimera, but each of us hanging on to our original names was less 
work”, and a second notes that she “couldn't be bothered to forward change of name to bank, 
utility companies etc”. Through allusion to the ‘path-of-least-resistance’, then, surname changes 
are constructed by these respondents as an unnecessary administrative burden. Other 
participants, however, note the administrative necessities of changing their surnames, describing 
the change being “practical in terms of general life admin”, for instance. One heterosexual 
female participant observes that she and her new husband “had several cheques made out to ‘Mr 
and Mrs....’ which the bank refused to cash until I changed my name”, and thus her ‘choice’ was 
forced upon her; rather than the respondent’s name problematising the bank’s customer 
infrastructure, it was the name that became the problem.  
 
In Section 4.2, we discussed some of the ways in which children had an impact on respondents’ 
feelings about married surnames, and the administration of family life was also a matter of 
concern for many of our respondents. Various participants cite the difficulties and confusion 
caused when families who do not share a common surname engage with institutions such as 
schools and doctor’s surgeries, for instance. And, despite minimal reported experience, the 
institutional interaction most mentioned as a cause for concern is conversing with border control 
during international travel; respondents refer to hearing “stories of children with different names 
being stopped when going on holiday”. These are often couples who have used both parents’ 
surnames as part of a child’s name, as in this response from an unmarried, heterosexual mother: 
“they have [my name] as a middle name… I heard this is easier if I ever get a plane with them 
there and not him”. One participant, who had kept her own name on getting married and given 
her child his father’s surname, expresses regret over her decision not to include her own surname 
as a middle name, saying “I worry about travelling abroad with him with different surnames”. 
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One interpretation of these fears is that the respondents are aware not just of societal norms 
relating to child naming but also of the organisational infrastructure that takes those norms as a 
basis. One heterosexual woman who kept her own name when she married but gave her children 
their father’s name, for instance, reports that: “at international borders I am asked what my 
relationship is to the children. I say I'm their mum, they ask ‘from birth?’.” According to Parental 
Passport Campaign (2014) research by YouGov has shown that more than 600,000 parents have 
been questioned at UK borders because their surnames do not match their children’s. Thus, 
heteronormative naming practices are embedded and operationalised in institutional, 
administrative structures, and these practices clearly impact on both same-sex and mixed-sex 
couples. In the final analysis section, below, we consider how the respondents perceived surname 
changes could affect people in same-sex relationships. 
 
4.5 Freedom and equality 
 
All respondents were asked if they thought that same-sex couples had different options with 
regards to their surnames on getting married, and the responses were particularly illuminating in 
terms of assumptions of relative freedom. Lesbians and gay men responding to this question 
typically articulate a sense of liberation in their answer, with this response from a lesbian woman 
being typical: “I think legally the options are the same, but in terms of social acceptability same-
sex couples have more options simply because there is no norm or hierarchy to conform to”. The 
concept of conforming and being socially acceptable resonate through all responses from gay 
and lesbian people in our survey, showing the salience of convention and the perceived weight of 
expectation on heterosexual couples: “because it’s not steeped in years of tradition, people don't 
feel bound to do what they 'should' do and can do what they please!”. The use of the modal verb 
‘should’ demonstrates the perception that heterosexual couples are not only expected but 
required to engage in name changing practices due to long-standing rituals and conventions. 
Indeed, more than 40 per cent of all responses to this question spoke of tradition or convention: 
‘tradition’ here is rarely used in explicitly positive ways, unlike in many of the responses 
considered in Section 4.1. Instead, its use is predominantly neutral (for example, ‘established 
tradition’) or negative (such as ‘old fashioned’), suggesting that its role is unclear when attached 
to non-heteronormative unions.  
 
In many of the responses to this question from heterosexual women, social pressures and the fear 
of judgement feature highly, as in: “it isn’t so clogged with ‘tradition’ so they can do whatever 
they like and I think people will be more accepting of this”. This response constructs tradition as 
a hindrance to decision making, with the metaphorical verb ‘clogged’ connoting a kind of 
residual build-up of something unpleasant. The use of inverted commas around ‘tradition’ also 
undermines its credibility as a description, suggesting that its commonplace use is euphemistic. 
Not only do same-sex couples have more freedom to choose (‘they can do whatever they like’), 
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in this sense, but they will not suffer the judgments that mixed-sex couples might when making 
non-traditional decisions. Clearly, this reveals the powerful role of ideology in maintaining 
particular practices; if heterosexual couples decide not to comply with convention, it is perceived 
that they may be punished for it. It is particularly revealing to consider the construction of 
agency in relation to this: mixed-sex couples are often presented as passive in responses to this 
question, while tradition, and the judgment of others, is active. “I suspect they’re the same 
options,” says one female, heterosexual respondent, “but you’re not led down a particular route – 
e.g. there is no ‘default’ imposed on people (our emphasis)”. Elsewhere, family opinion is 
described as “bearing down upon” mixed-sex couples.  
 
Responses from heterosexual women here suggest that, even when tradition is merely a guide, it 
is agentive. Respondents who describe their own choices or plans in traditional terms, taking 
their husband’s surname as well as giving it to their children with few indicators of reluctance, 
typically appraise that tradition differently in the abstract, or when considering the circumstances 
for same-sex couples. In part, this may be due to the perceived difference in what marriage might 
entail for same-sex couples and heterosexual ones; just as children were presented as critical in 
the decision of many couples to take on a shared name, an assumed absence of children in same-
sex relationships is thought to lead to greater flexibility. For example, one heterosexual woman 
states that “...it seems like they do not have the same pressure. Maybe because they are slightly 
less likely to have children?”, while another says “They have the same options but seem to make 
different choices, maybe because they are somewhat less likely to have children”. These 
responses reflect a complex cultural picture in which heteronormative ideologies dictate that 
heterosexuals are expected to want and have children, yet same-sex couples who want children 
have a more complex road ahead of them. It is worth noting the attempt to avoid othering here; 
although the nature of the question they are answering requires them to talk about gay people as 
different to heterosexual people, the women in the examples above use hedging devices that 
weaken their commitment to this proposition. In the adjective phrases ‘slightly less likely’ and 
‘somewhat less likely’, the premodifying modal adverbs express weak modality; the modal verb 
‘seems’ also weakens the degree of commitment attached to the notion that gay and heterosexual 
couples ‘do not face the same pressure’. In fact, statistics (ONS, 2014) would suggest that same-
sex couples are substantially less likely to have children; the fact our respondents often sought to 
downplay differences between same-sex relationships and heterosexual ones may reflect, then, a 
somewhat liberal approach to homosexuality amongst our respondents. 
 
Returning to the idea of marital convention, there are several suggestions in the data that same-
sex couples will develop ‘their own traditions’, which are missing only for want of time. 
However, these are far outnumbered by those – including some who do not believe that there 
actually are different or more options for same-sex couples – who echo the feeling that same-sex 
couples ‘can do whatever they like’, and often seem to imagine that this freedom translates into a 
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catalogue of exotic creativity. Interestingly, these responses are often laced with a sense of envy 
that several respondents make explicit in answers such as: “They can do whatever feels right for 
their relationship – I envy their freedom”; “They can choose the best surname that works for both 
of them! I’m jealous!”. Here, this jealousy is tied not only to the freedom of same-sex couples to 
choose what is right for them, but a sense that such freedom is exercised in the interests of both 
partners. We were surprised to find the assumption that men and women, and therefore mixed-
sex relationships, were not equal underlying a number of responses saying same-sex couples had 
different naming options. It was especially surprising to find this assumption premised on 
biological differences – that the difference of sex creates a status imbalance within the 
relationship that would not exist in same-sex relationships. For example, one heterosexual 
woman says, “Yes, because biologically they are more equal, so they are starting from a more 
equal position,” while another believes “both partners are of equal status due to being the same 
sex”. The vast majority of such responses lacked any kind of stance hedging such as “I think”, or 
words expressing weak epistemic modality such as “maybe” or “perhaps”. This stance-taking 
quite clearly positions heterosexuals as fundamentally unequal, then; although this perspective 
was not unanimous, its recurrence in the data does suggest that, unusually, same-sex couples are 
seen as being at an advantage compared to mixed-sex ones – at least when it comes to marriage. 
  
Overall, responses to this question placed same-sex couples as having more flexibility and 
greater freedom than heterosexuals when it comes to naming strategies in marriage. These 
responses imply, then, that the traditions and expectations upon heterosexual people – though 
often taken on without particular consideration or analysis, as shown in section 4.1 – are often 
perceived as constraining. Indeed, the envy shown by some heterosexual respondents towards 
same-sex couples’ options suggests that many heterosexual people (and particularly women) do 
not feel that they have a choice when it comes to their surname upon marriage. In this sense, 
freedom of choice in this matter is typically seen as unique to same-sex couples rather than 
available to all. In our concluding discussion we consider the potential impact of this, by 
questioning whether the advent of same-sex marriage might help to reveal the ideological 
assumptions that are connected to heterosexual marriage.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
  
As outlined earlier, we do not claim that the data collected from this survey represents a typical 
or standard view on naming strategies in relation to marriage. However, there are a number of 
key ideological messages that are both explicitly (often critically) expressed and implicitly 
indexed in the responses. Firstly, it is clear patriarchal norms regarding women taking their 
husband’s surnames are frequently framed as ‘traditional values’ which, by virtue of being 
steeped in history, are often situated as ‘common sense’. Furthermore, it is clear from our 
discussion that many heterosexual women, in particular, perceive these ‘values’ as being policed 
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by others in their community, leading to a social pressure to conform. At times this pressure 
comes from within the partnership, with husbands-to-be exercising what Safilios-Rothschild 
(1976) calls orchestration power; the power to make less frequent, consequential decisions, 
rather than the more mundane and time-consuming decision-making left to their brides. Many 
people, of course, feel a positive relationship with tradition and consciously express this in our 
data; for these individuals, a shared family name indexes a traditionalist as well as 
institutionally-recognised identity.  
 
It is also clear from the data that the concept of being united as a family is a central driver for 
those who (would) choose to take a shared name; often, for these respondents, the taking of a 
shared name is an act of identity which provides public recognition of their status. In this 
context, marriage is often conceptualised as fundamentally heteronormative; this is apparent 
from the respondents’ tendency to assume that marriage naturally leads to children (and that 
having children means needing to share a name). Overall, when it comes to heterosexual 
women’s agency in deciding what to do about their name, any deliberation typically concerns the 
welfare and administrative needs of their (potential or actual) children; this was not a theme 
identified amongst men, reflecting the continuation of patriarchal assumptions regarding 
maternal responsibilities. For many respondents, of course, a desire for independence fuels 
strong stance-taking away from the traditions of surname changes; resistance is typically based 
on a perceived loss of one’s own identity, demonstrating quite clearly the links between the 
names that we use for ourselves and the way we wish to be interpreted on a social level. If social 
identity is the way we position ourselves and other people, as Bucholtz and Hall (2005: 586) 
claim, the terms of address we use allows us to present ourselves as a particular type of person 
and in line with the cultural meanings indexed by them (e.g. ‘wife’). In this sense, it is clear that 
naming strategies carry significant sociocultural weight and value. 
  
This study has explicitly addressed the concerns of not only heterosexual women and men, but 
those of a range of identities15, and has taken into account the context of same-sex marriage as 
well as heterosexual marriage. Indeed, it is in relation to the question of same-sex married 
couples and their options concerning their surnames that some of the most interesting data has 
emerged. Overwhelmingly, our respondents suggest that same-sex couples have more relative 
freedom and equality; given that the institution of marriage is now legally equal for same-sex 
and mixed-sex couples in the UK, it is interesting that this aspect is perceived so differently. That 
greater restrictions are ideologically imposed upon mixed-sex couples may render marriage as 
one of very few institutional instances where being lesbian or gay is seen to be advantageous. 
More than this, the responses here strengthen our worrying conclusions regarding sexism in 
                                               
15 Twenty-three respondents identified with other non-binary sexuality labels (e.g. ‘asexual’, ‘pansexual’, 
‘bisexual/queer’) and five people self-identified with non-binary gender labels (e.g. ‘genderqueer’, ‘non-binary’). 
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marital naming practice; many (but by no means all) heterosexual women, in particular, feel 
obliged to take on a new name despite feeling that they are losing something of themselves in 
doing so. As time proceeds, it may be that the choices of same-sex couples – whereby they feel 
relative freedom compared to heterosexual couples – become more widespread; as same-sex 
marriage becomes more commonplace, conventions developed may also become culturally 
normalised. In other words, people in heterosexual unions may feel fewer constraints upon them 
once the full range of options regarding surnames (from keeping one’s own to creating 
something entirely new) is more common. This will only occur, of course, if same-sex marriage 
becomes not only commonplace but normalised; the prevalence of the phrase ‘gay marriage’ in 
the UK (around 2400 mentions in the national press in the six months to article submission16) 
suggests that, currently, only the unmarked form ‘marriage’ is taken as ‘normal’. 
 
Although the respondents talked of choice in relation to their surname strategies, however, it is 
important to engage critically with the very concept of marital naming – from both a feminist and 
queer perspective. Ultimately, after all, the range of ‘options’ available to those who marry are in 
themselves ideological, and as Montemurro (2005, p. 27) points out, ’perhaps even those who do 
not regularly subscribe to old-fashioned gender roles feel compelled to construct them as a 
means of enacting the bride-to-be and groom-to-be roles properly’. The historical expectation 
that a woman would marry a man and take his name for their future family is so culturally 
ingrained that it has come to be seen as the default position; to make any move away from that is 
therefore to make a statement.17 Whilst couples may perceive a decision to, for example, double-
barrel their names or retain their original names as an agentive one, the stances taken are only 
possible within an institutional framework already set out for them. Indeed, the fact that so many 
heterosexual women in our data had made decisions one way or another, whereas the men 
typically had not needed to, demonstrates the intrinsically patriarchal framework within which 
these choices are made. Being resistant to sexist structures still, after all, means engaging with 
them at some level.  
 
These structures are not only patriarchal, of course; they are heteronormative, in that they have 
been designed for mixed-sex couples to create two-parent biological families that are 
institutionally recognised – and sanctioned – as ‘typical’. While some of our heterosexual 
respondents express envy at the apparent flexibility of same-sex couples, they do so in relation to 
mixed-sex marriage; the fundamentally heteronormative institution of marriage may have 
adapted to include same-sex couples, but the way that we think about these relationships is in 
                                               
16 LexisNexis.com search, 20 July 2015 
17 Besel et al. (2009: 116) found that bridal books encouraged women to make their own decisions, yet 
simultaneously stressed the importance of tradition; breaking with it requires care. The authors describe their sample 
of books as being “permeated with messages encouraging couples to maintain traditional gender roles and 
expectations” (2009: 119). 
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relation to that institution and therefore such relationships are different. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the apparent freedom of same-sex couples to ‘do what they like’ is somewhat 
idealistic if those couples have children; it tends to be assumed that they would not, within our 
data, yet those that do are forced to negotiate ideals and norms associated with children having a 
paternal surname that simply may not fit into a same-sex parenting model. In this way, we can 
see that the ideologies surrounding marital naming practices not only constrain heterosexual 
people, but that they operate to mark out those in same-sex relationships as separate or other, 
despite the recent inclusion of different relationships into the British institution of marriage. 
 
As argued at the beginning of this paper, it is through the institutionalised conventions that are 
often taken for granted that powerful ideologies are legitimised and reproduced. We have shown 
here that choices people make regarding their own surnames are unavoidably tied into pre-
existing ideological structures. For those taking a stance against a name change, it is possible to 
index a ‘feminist’ or ‘independent’ identity, yet in doing so one is forced to deviate from the 
norm and do something which articulates difference. For those women in mixed-sex 
relationships who favour tradition, a sense of agency may exist which reflects postfeminist 
discourse – though critics of this stance may argue that this “defensively sentimental celebration 
of femininity” (McRobbie 2009: 32) ignores the fact that the ‘options’ available to these women 
are only ever institutionally regulated and sanctioned. Indeed, it is clear from the responses 
presented here that participants do not typically think of their decisions regarding their names as 
being embedded within and operationalised by state structures – instead, they talk of their 
personal relationships with their families and partners, or their own identities as individuals. Yet, 
we would argue, the decision of an individual to conform or deviate from the norm reflects a 
stance taken to the institution of marriage overall; to abide by tradition is to be clearly and 
consistently legible as a married couple, and not to do so is to position oneself in line with a less 
clearly defined and less institutionally valued category. As same-sex marriage increases and 
becomes more typical, we ask whether the less clearly defined category – and the naming 
strategies that come along with it – will begin to become the norm. 
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